The power grid and the communication network are highly interdependent on each other for their well being. In recent times the research community has shown significant interest in modeling such interdependent networks and studying the impact of failures on these networks. Although a number of models have been proposed, many of them are simplistic in nature and fail to capture the complex interdependencies that exist between the entities of these networks. To overcome the limitations, recently an Implicative Interdependency Model that utilizes Boolean Logic, was proposed and a number of problems were studied. In this paper we study the "entity hardening" problem, where by "entity hardening" we imply the ability of the network operator to ensure that an adversary (be it Nature or human) cannot take a network entity from operative to inoperative state. Given that the network operator with a limited budget can only harden k entities, the goal of the entity hardening problem is to identify the set of k entities whose hardening will ensure maximum benefit for the operator, i.e. maximally reduce the ability of the adversary to degrade the network. We classify the problem into four cases and show that the problem is solvable in polynomial time for the first case, whereas for others it is NP-complete. We provide an inapproximability result for the second case, an approximation algorithm for the third case, and a heuristic for the fourth (general) case. We evaluate the efficacy of our heuristic using power and communication network data of Maricopa County, Arizona. The experiments show that our heuristic almost always produces near optimal results.
I. INTRODUCTION
The critical infrastructures of a nation form a complex symbiotic ecosystem where individual infrastructures are heavily interdependent on each other for being fully functional. Two such critical systems that rely heavily on each other for their well being are the power and communication network infrastructures. For instance, power grid entities such as SCADA systems, that are used to remotely operate power generation units, receive their control commands over the communication network infrastructure, while communication network entities such as routers and base stations are inoperable without electric power. Thus, failure introduced in the system either by Nature (hurricanes), or man (terrorist attacks), can trigger further failures in the system due to interdependencies between the entities of the two infrastructures.
Although a number of models have been proposed for This research was supported in part by the DTRA grant HDTRA1-09-1-0032, the AFOSR grant FA9550-09-1-0120, and the NSF grant 1441214. The data for the Maricopa county communication network used in this research was provided by GeoTel communications (www.geo-tel.com). modeling and analysis of interdependent multi-layered networks [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] , many of these models are simplistic in nature and fail to capture the complex interdependencies that exists between the entities of these networks. As noted in [9] , these models fail to model complex interdependencies that may exist between network entities, such as when entity a i is operational, if entities (i) b j and b k and b l are operational, or (ii) b m and b n are operational, or (iii) b p is operational. Graph based dependency models proposed in the literature such as [3] , [4] , [5] , [10] , [6] , [7] including [1] , [2] cannot capture such complex interdependency involving both conjunctive and disjunctive terms between entities of multi-layer networks. To overcome these limitations, an Implicative Interdependency Model that utilizes Boolean Logic, was recently proposed in [9] , and a number of problems including computation of K most vulnerable nodes [9] , root cause of failure analysis [11] , and progressive recovery from failures [12] , were studied using this model.
In this paper we study the "entity hardening" problem in the interdependent power-communication network using the Implicative Interdependency Model (IIM). By "entity hardening", we imply the ability of the network operator to ensure that an adversary (be it Nature or human), cannot take a network entity from an operative (operational) to an inoperative (failed) state. We assume that the adversary is clever and is capable of identifying the most vulnerable entities in the network that causes maximum damage to the interdependent system. However, the adversary does not have an unlimited budget and has the resources to destroy at most K entities of the interdependent network. The network operator is also aware of adversary's target entities for destruction. Since we assume that once an entity is "hardened" by the network operator it cannot be destroyed by the adversary, if all K targets of the adversary are hardened by the network operator, then the adversary cannot induce any failure in the network. However, if due to resource limitations the network operator is able to strengthen only k entities, where k < K, these k entities have to be carefully chosen. The goal of the entity hardening problem is to identify the set of k entities whose hardening will ensure maximum benefit for the operator, i.e. maximally reduce the adversary's ability to degrade the network.
We classify the entity hardening problem into four different cases depending on the nature of the interdependency relationships. We show that the first case can be solved in polynomial time, and all other cases are shown to be NP-complete. We provide an inapproximability result for the second case, an 2 approximation algorithm for the third case, and a heuristic for the fourth (general) case. We evaluate the efficacy of our heuristic using power and communication network data of Maricopa County, Arizona. The experiments show that our heuristic almost always produces near optimal results. The paper is organized as follows, the IIM model is presented in Section II, in Sections III and IV we formally state the entity hardening problem and analyze its computational complexity, Section V outlines the optimal and heuristic solutions to the problem, and finally Section VI shows the experimental results.
II. INTERDEPENDENCY MODEL
We now present an overview of the underlying IIM interdependency model [9] . IIM uses Boolean Logic to model the interdependencies between network entities, these interdependent relationships are termed as Implicative Interdependency Relations (IDRs). We represent this interdependent network setting as I(A, B, F(A, B)), where sets A and B are the power and communication network entities respectively, and F(A, B) is the set of dependency relations, or IDRs. Table I 
is the set of IDRs (dependency relations) between the entities of A and B. In this example, the IDR b 1 ← a 1 a 3 + a 2 implies that entity b 1 is operational when both the entities a 1 and a 3 are operational, or entity a 2 is operational. The conjunction of entities, such as a 1 a 3 , is also referred to as a minterm.
It may be noted that although in the IDRs of Table I , A (B) type entities appear either on the left hand side or on the right hand side of an IDR, the IIM does not require that the A (B) type entities appear only on one side of an IDR. In other words, an IDR can be of the form Given a set of inoperable (failed) entities, a time stepped failure cascade can be derived from the dependency relationships outlined in the IDR set. For example, for the interdependent network outlined in Table I, Table II shows the failure propagation when entities {a 2 , b 3 } fail at the initial time step (t = 0). It may be noted that the model assumes that dependent entities fail immediately in the next time step, for example, when {a 2 , b 3 } fail at t = 0, b 2 fails at t = 1 as b 2 is dependent on a 2 for its survival. The system reaches a steady state when the failure propagation process stops. In this example, when {a 2 , b 3 } fail at t = 0, the steady state is reached at time step t = 4.
A primary consideration for using this model is the accurate formulation of the IDRs that is representative of the underlying physical power and communication network infrastructures. This can either be done by careful analysis as done in [8] , or by consultation with experts of these infrastructures. We utilize IIM to model the interdependency between the two networks and analyze the entity hardening problem in this setting. 
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Before we make a formal statement of the entity hardening problem in the IIM setting, we explain it with the help of an example. Consider an interdependent system as outlined in the IDR set shown in Table I . It may be easily checked that when the adversary budget is K= 2, the most vulnerable entities of this system are {a 2 , b 3 }. If the network operator doesn't harden any one of the entities a 2 or b 3 , then in this example all the network entities eventually fail, as seen from the fault propagation in Table II . When the network operator chooses to harden both a 2 and b 3 then none of the entities in the network fail if the adversary restricts the attack only to the two most vulnerable entities of the network, which in this example happens to be {a 2 , b 3 }. If the network operator has resources to harden only one entity and the operator chooses to harden a 2 , the destruction of b 3 by the adversary will eventually lead to the failure of no other entities of the network, as shown in Table III (a). If on the other hand, the network operator chooses to harden b 3 , destruction by the adversary of a 2 will eventually lead to the failure of the entities {a 2 , b 2 , a 1 , b 1 } as shown in Table III (b). Clearly in this scenario the operator should harden a 2 instead of b 3 .
Definition: Kill Set of a set of Entities(S): The kill set of a set of entities S, is the set of all entities that will eventually fail due to failure of S and the interdependencies between the entities of the network as given by the set of IDR's. The kill set of a set of entities S is denoted by KillSet(S).
It may be noted that the search for k entities to be hardened is restricted to the KillSet(S), where S is the set of K most vulnerable entities in the network, because hardening any entity not in KillSet(S) does not provide any benefit to the network operator. In this study we also assume that the set of K most vulnerable entities in the network is unique.
Entities
Time We now proceed to formulate the entity hardening problem formally. Given an interdependent network system I(A, B, F(A, B)), and the set of K most vulnerable entities of the system A ∪ B , where A ⊆ A and B ⊆ B: We note some of the assumptions for the ENH problem: First, we assume that once an entity is hardened, it is always operational and does not fail at any time step of the observation, even when the entity is part of the K most vulnerable entities. Second, we assume that k < K, as otherwise the selection of K entities for hardening ensures that no entities fail at all. Finally, as noted earlier, we assume that the set of K most vulnerable entities in the network is unique. We now proceed to analyze the computational complexity of the ENH problem.
IV. COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
For an interdependent network I(A, B, F(A, B)) the IDRs can be represented in four different forms. We analyze the computational complexity of the ENH problem for each of these cases separately.
A. Case I: Problem Instance with One Minterm of Size One
The IDRs of Case I have a single minterm of size 1. This can be represented as x i ← y j , where x i and y j are entities of network A(B) and B(A) respectively. Algorithm 1 solves the ENH problem for Case I optimally in polynomial time. The proof of this claim is left out due to lack of space, the proof can be found in [13] . 
Choose the top k sets from D with highest cardinality ; In the constructed instance only entities of set A are dependent on entities of set B. Additionally the dependency for an entity a i consists of conjunction of entities in set B. Hence for an entity a i ∈ A to fail, either it itself has to fail initially or all entities to which a i is dependent on has to fail. It is to be noted that the entities in set B has no induced failure i.e., there is no cascade. Following from this assertion, with K = p, the solution A = ∅ and B = B would fail all entities in set A ∪ B. Moreover this is the single unique solution to the problem instance. This is because by including one entity a i in the initial failure set would result in not failing at least one entity b j for a given budget K = p. Hence it won't fail the entire set of entities in A ∪ B.
If an entity in set A is hardened then it would have no effect in failure prevention of any other entities. Whereas hardening an entity b m ∈ B might result in failure prevention of an entity a i ∈ A with IDR a j ← b m b n b q provided that entities b n , b q are also defended. With k = p (and K ≤ |V | = |B|) it can be ensured that entities to be defended are from set B .
To prove the theorem consider that there is a solution to the Densest p-Subhypergraph problem. Then there exist p vertices which induces a subgraph which has at least M hyperedges. Hardening the entities b i ∈ B for each vertex v i in the solution of the Densest p-Subhypergraph problem would then ensure that at least M entities in set A are protected from failure. This is because the entities in set A for which the failure is prevented corresponds to the hyperedges in the induced subgraph. Thus the number of entities that fail after hardening p entities is at most |V | + |E| − p − M , solving the ENH problem. Now consider that there is a solution to the ENH problem. As previously stated, the entities to be hardened will always be from set B . So defending p entities from set B F(A, B) having IDRs of form Case II, it is hard to approximate the ENH problem within a factor of 1 2 log(n) λ for some λ > 0.
Proof: From Theorem 1, Densest p-Subhypergraph problem has been shown to be a special case of the ENH problem with IDRs of form Case II. Densest p-Subhypergraph problem is proved to be inapproximable within a factor of [14] . Hence the theorem follows.
C. Case III: Problem Instance with an Arbitrary Number of Minterm of Size One
The IDRs of Case III have arbitrary number of minterm of size 1. This can be represented as x i ← p q=1 y q , where x i and y q are entities of network A(B) and B(A) respectively and the number of minterms are p. The ENH problem with respect to Case III is NP-complete and is proved in Theorem 3.
Theorem 3. The ENH problem for Case III is NP Complete
Proof: The ENH problem for case III is proved to be NP complete by giving a reduction from the Set Cover Problem, a well known NP-complete problem. An instance of the Set Cover problem includes a set S = {x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n }, a set S = {S 1 , S 2 , ..., S m } where S i ⊆ S and a positive integer M . The problem asks the question whether there exists at most M subsets from set S whose union would result in the set S. From an instance of the set cover problem we create an instance of the ENH problem in the following way. For each element x i in set S we add an entity a i in set A. For each subset S i in set S we add an entity b i in set B. For all subsets in S, say S p , S m , S n , which has the element x i there is an IDR of form a i ← b m + b n + b l . The values of positive integers k and E F are set to M and m − M respectively. It is assumed that the value of K = m.
With similar reasoning as that of Case II it can be shown that for K = m the maximum number of node failures (i.e. failure of all entities in A ∪ B) would occur if A = ∅ and B = B. This is also the single unique solution to the problem instance.
The constructed instance also ensures that the entities to be hardened are from set B (A not considered as it is equal to ∅). This is because protecting an entity a i ∈ A would only result in prevention of its own failure whereas protecting an entity b j ∈ B would result in failure prevention of its own and all other entities in set A for which it appears in its IDR.
To begin with the proof, consider that there is a solution to the Set Cover problem. Then there exist M subsets (or elements in set S) whose union results in the set S. Hardening the entities in set B corresponding to the subsets selected would ensure that all entities in set A are prevented from failure. This is because for the dependency of each entity a i ∈ A there exist at least one entity (in set B) that is hardened. Hence the number of entities that fails after hardening is m−M which is equal to E F , thus solving the ENH problem. Now, consider that there is a solution to the ENH problem. As discussed above the entities to be hardened should be from set B . To achieve E F = m − M with k = M , no entities in the set A must fail. Hence for each entity a i ∈ A at least one entity in set B that appears in its IDR has to be hardened. Thus, it directly follows that the union of subsets in set S corresponding to the entities hardened is equal to the set S, solving the Set Cover Problem.
1) Approximation Scheme for Case 3:
In this subsection we provide an approximation algorithm for Case 3 of the problem. For an interdependent network I (A, B, F(A, B) ) with the initial failed set of entities as A ∪ B we define Protection Set of each entity as follows.
Definition: For an entity x i ∈ A ∪ B the Protection Set is defined as the entities that would be prevented from failure by hardening the entity x i when all entities in A ∪ B fails initially. This is represented as P (x i |A ∪ B ).
The Protection Set of each entity can be computed in O((n + m) 2 ) where n and m are the number of entities and number of minterms respectively in an interdependent network I (A, B, F(A, B) ) .
when IDRs are of form Case III.
Proof: Assume that defending two entities x i and x j would result in preventing failure of P (
Then there exist at least one entity x p / ∈ P (x i |A ∪ B ) ∪ P (x j |A ∪ B ) such that it's failure is prevented only if x i and x j is protected together. So two entities x m and x n (with x m ∈ P (x i |A ∪B ) and x n ∈ P (x j |A ∪B ) or vice versa) have to be present in the IDR of x p . As the IDRs are of form Case III so if any one of x m or x n is protected then x p is protected, hence a contradiction. On the other way round P (x i , x j |A ∪ B ) contains all entities which would be prevented from failure if x i or x j is defended alone. So it directly follows that |P (x i |A ∪ B ) ∪ P (x j |A ∪ B )| > |P (x i , x j |A ∪ B )| is not possible. Hence the theorem holds.
Theorem 5. There exists an 1 − 1 e approximation algorithm that approximates the ENH problem for Case III.
Proof: The approximation algorithm is constructed by modeling the problem as Maximum Coverage problem. An instance of the maximum coverage problem consists of a set S = {x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n }, a set S = {S 1 , S 2 , ..., S m } where S i ⊆ S and a positive integer M . The objective of the problem is to find a set S ⊆ S and |S | ≤ M such that ∪ Si∈S S i is maximized. For a given initial failure set A ∪ B with |A |+|B | ≤ K, let P (x i |A ∪B ) denote the protection set for each entity x i ∈ A ∪ B. We construct a set S = A ∪ B and for each entity x i a set S xi ⊆ S such that S xi = P (x i |A ∪ B ). Each set S xi is added as an element of a set S. The conversion of the problem to Maximum Coverage problem can be done in polynomial time. By Theorem 4 defending a set of entities X ⊆ S would result in failure prevention of ∪ xi∈X S xi entities. Hence, with the constructed sets S and S and a positive integer 
V. SOLUTIONS TO THE ENTITY HARDENING PROBLEM

A. Optimal Solution using Integer Linear Programming
Due to lack of space we omit the ILP formulation that finds the optimal solution to the ENH problem. This formulation can be found in [13] .
B. Heuristic Solution
In this subsection we provide a greedy heuristic solution to the Entity Hardening problem. For a given interdependent network I (A, B, F(A, B) ) with the initial failed set of entities as A ∪ B , apart from the Protection Set of each entity as defined earlier, we now define the Minterm Coverage Number of each entity in A ∪ B as follows:
Definition: For an entity x i ∈ A ∪ B the Minterm Coverage Number is defined as the number of minterms that can be removed from F(A, B) without affecting the cascading process by hardening the entity x i when all entities in A ∪ B fails initially. This is represented as M (x i |A ∪ B ).
It may be noted here that the Minterm Coverage Number of each entity can be computed in O((n+m) 2 ). We now present a heurisitc for the ENH problem in Algorithm 2. The algorithm takes as input an interdependent network I (A, B, F(A, B) ) with S = A ∪ B. In steps 4-5 the set Q is constructed to include the set of entities that do not fail when the K most vulnerable entities fail. These Q entities are removed from the search space as they have no impact on the hardening process. In each iteration of the while loop in steps 6-17, an entity x d is greedily selected such that when x d is hardened, it prevents failure of the maximum number of entities. This ensures that at each step the number of entities that may fail is minimized. In case of a tie, among all entities involved in the tie, the entity having the highest Minterm Coverage Number is included in the solution. This tie breaking technique gives more priority to the entity which when hardened has more impact on failure minimization in subsequent iterations of the while loop. The interdependent network I (A, B, F(A, B) ) is updated in steps 13-16 of the algorithm. This update is done to take into account the effect of hardening an entity in the current iteration on entities hardened in the subsequent iterations. 
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section we present the experimental results of the Entity Hardening problem by comparing the optimal solution computed using an ILP, and the proposed heuristic algorithm. The experiments were conducted on real world power grid data obtained from Platts (www.platts.com), and communication network data obtained from GeoTel (www.geo-tel.com) for Maricopa County, Arizona. The data consisted of 70 power plants and 470 transmission lines in the power network, and 2, 690 cell towers, 7, 100 fiber-lit buildings and 42, 723 fiber 1 1
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(e) Region 5 Fig. 1 : Comparison of the optimal (ILP), and heuristic approaches on the total number of entities that fail when the K most vulnerable entities fail and k entities are hardened. In our experiments K was set to 8. For the Regions 1-5, when no entities were hardened (k = 0), the failure of the K = 8 most vulnerable entities resulted in the total failure of 28, 23, 28, 28 and 27 entities respectively. links in the communication network. We identified five nonintersecting geographical regions from the data set and labeled them from regions 1 through 5. For each of the regions, the entities of the power and communication network that were located within the geographic region formed the set A and B respectively. Each region was represented by an interdependent network I (A, B, F(A, B) ). We use the IDR construction rules as defined in [9] to generate F(A, B).
In all of our simulations IBM CPLEX Optimizer 12.5 to solve ILPs and Python 3 for heuristic is used. To analyze the Entity Hardening problem the value of K was set to 8. The ILP in [9] was used to compute the K most vulnerable nodes in the network, and the set of failed entities due to the failure of the K entities was also computed. For the five regions, when no entities were hardened, the failure of the K = 8 most vulnerable entities resulted in the failure of 28, 23, 28, 28 and 27 entities respectively. With the K most vulnerable nodes and final set of failed nodes as input, the ILP and heuristic of the Entity Hardening problem are compared with k = 1, 3, 5, 7. The results of these simulations are shown in Figure 1 . It is observed that the heuristic solution differs more from optimal at higher values of k (factor of 0.5 and 0.67 for Regions 1 and 3 respectively with k = 7). This is primarily because of the greedy nature of Algorithm 2. However on an average the heuristic solution differs by a factor of 0.13 from the optimal.
